This paper examines how the rule of law and democratic accountability have affected Hong Kong's GDP growth rate in the past 20 years. We find that democratic accountability has deteriorated substantially since the changeover of sovereignty in 1997, while the rule of law has remained strong and stable. Empirical results from ARDL bounds tests show a strong positive long-run relationship between growth and democratic accountability, and Granger causality tests reveal that democratic accountability causes the growth rate of GDP in the short run. These conclusions are robust to controlling for the effects of investment and the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Our results suggest that the deterioration in democratic accountability following the handover in 1997 has come at the expense of a considerable decline in economic growth, and controverts popular arguments in Hong Kong that improving democratic accountability will harm economic growth.
Introduction
Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) after its sovereignty reverted to China in July 1997. Since then, the Basic Law, which is the SAR's miniconstitution, has functioned as the foundation of "one country, two systems" in the SAR.
It is true that Hong Kong SAR has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy under this arrangement, but its sovereignty resides with non-democratic institutions ultimately chosen by the central government in Beijing. What are the effects, if any, of the rapid change of institutions from a colony to a SAR on the quality of governance in Hong Kong? More importantly, has the prosperity of Hong Kong been compromised by such a drastic change of its institutions? These are serious questions deserving a formal analysis.
As one of the Asian tigers, the rapid growth of Hong Kong's economy during the colonial period has been widely documented. With its real GDP per capita of US$26, 699 in 2000, Hong Kong is now one of the five richest economies in the world, surpassing even industrialized countries such as Japan, Great Britain and France. 1 The precise factors that account for its miraculous growth have been the subject of considerable debate. However, a consensus seems to have emerged that a major part of Hong Kong's success is due to its reliance on market-oriented, laissez faire policies and the rule of law tradition. Moreover, it has been observed that Hong Kong's hands-off approach to development under colonial rule differed fundamentally from the more interventionist strategies adopted by Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. The uniqueness of Hong Kong's past success coupled with its rapid but peaceful institutional change in 1997 provides a rare opportunity for a case study of the relationship between institutions and economic performance.
Since the changeover of sovereignty in July 1997, a series of government decisions and policies appear to have negatively affected the quality of institutions and confidence in the SAR. Most noticeably, the plan to introduce the national security legislation, In the empirical literature, researchers find strong evidence to indicate that institutional quality is one of the most important factors of long-run economic growth.
The protection of property rights, efficiency of the bureaucracy, and effectiveness of the rule of law are the most widely-used aspects of institutions that have been found to significantly affect the long-run income level or growth rate in cross-country econometric studies (see, for example, North and Thomas, 1973; Jones, 1981; North, 1981; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999) . More recent studies have even gone beyond correlations to establish causation between the protection of property rights and higher income levels (see Acemoglu et al., 2001 ).
However, the effects of institutions on growth or income level are less clear when institutions are represented by the degree of democracy. Borner et al. (1995) report that out of sixteen empirical studies, three find a positive relationship between democracy and growth, three find a negative relationship and the remaining ten are inconclusive. Helliwell (1994) and Barro (1996) , find a non-significant negative effect of democracy on growth once several growth-determining variables are held constant. Tavares and 2 See Ho and Wong (2003) , who strongly argue that the weakness in Hong Kong's housing market and Hong Kong's protracted economic downturn after 1997 are homemade rather than imported. 3 A report prepared by Standard and Poor's in March 2003 criticizes the inability of the SAR government to deal with the worsening structural deficit. It states that Tung's administration lacks the credibility and popular support to implement policies for reducing the increasing fiscal imbalance, and that the future of Hong Kong's credit ratings hinges on whether the SAR executive is able to muster enough political skill to reduce the structural fiscal imbalance. Wacziarg (2001) find that democracy fosters growth by improving the accumulation of human capital and by lowering income inequality, but hinders growth by reducing the rate of physical accumulation and by raising the ratio of government consumption to GDP. They find that the net effect of democracy on growth is moderately negative. In contrast, Acemoglu et al. (2003) use the constraint on executive power as a measure of institutional quality and find that a higher degree of constraint on executive power causes a higher level of income, lesser volatile growth and fewer economic crises.
The question of how democratic institutions ultimately affect growth is still unresolved in the empirical literature. What we do know is that there can be a variety of channels through which democracy affects growth, including political stability, quality of governance, government size, human capital, income equality, trade openness and physical capital accumulation. 4 In addition, Rodrik (2000) emphasizes the importance of "local knowledge" that allows the market to perform adequately. He argues that participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and aggregating local knowledge. Thus, according to him, democracy is a meta-institution for building good institutions, and there is strong evidence to indicate that participatory democracies enable higher quality growth.
The present study contributes to the rich body of literature on growth and democracy by looking at the unique situation of Hong Kong, where the recent substantial change in institutions provides an ideal case for further study and also one in which we can use time-series rather than the more common cross-section or panel approaches. Moreover, there is an important unresolved debate in Hong Kong about the effect of the changeover on its growth. As a preview of the results, our time-series study finds that democratic accountability in Hong Kong has suffered a substantial deterioration since the changeover in 1997. The rule of law, however, has remained strong and stable for the past twenty years. More importantly, we find strong evidence of a causal relationship between democratic accountability and the growth rate of Hong Kong both in the long-and shortrun. The evidence cannot be discounted by the advent of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 or changes in the investment rate. This paper reaches the conclusion that democratic accountability is an important factor determining output growth for Hong Kong both in the long-and short-run. Therefore, the widely-accepted contention that democratic reforms retard Hong Kong's growth is unfounded. On the contrary, promoting a faster pace of democratic reform is likely to lead to more prosperity.
The remaining part of this paper is divided into seven sections. In Section Two, we describe the dataset, and in Section Three we outline the time-series econometric methods used. Section Four presents the results of stationary tests. Sections Five and Six present the estimation results of the ARDL bounds tests and Granger causation tests, respectively. Robustness checks are conducted in Section Seven. Finally, we conclude and summarize in Section Eight.
Data
This paper argues that Hong Kong's robust protection of property rights, the rule of law, and a market-oriented, laissez-faire approach to governance are the pillars of its economic success. To test this, we choose from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) two indexes (the rule of law and democratic accountability) to represent those institutional qualities that have traditionally characterized Hong Kong. Moreover, we are interested in studying not only those institutional qualities that relate to the protection of private property rights such as the rule of law, but also those that relate to political risk and stability such as democratic accountability. By selecting both the rule of law and democratic accountability, our study of institutional change can encompass the multifaceted nature of institutions.
The rule of law index "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." 5 The highest score of 6 indicates "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power." The lowest score of 0
indicates "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims." Figure 1 shows the rule of law index from the first quarter of 1984, the earliest available data from ICRG, to the third quarter of 2003. 6 Hong Kong's rule of law index remains high and relatively constant, fluctuating within a band of 4 to 6. It shows no remarkable changes even after the reversion of sovereignty in July 1997, which indicates that the perception of the impartiality of the legal system in Hong Kong continues to be strong and that people continue to be law-abiding and respectful of the court system. Thus, the rule of law ratings indicate that institutional quality remains strong in the SAR. 1 9 8 4 . 1 1 9 8 5 . 1 1 9 8 6 . 1 1 9 8 7 . 1 1 9 8 8 . 1 1 9 8 9 . 1 1 9 9 0 . 1 1 9 9 1 . 1 1 9 9 2 . 1 1 9 9 3 . 1 1 9 9 4 . 1 1 9 9 5 . 1 1 9 9 6 . 1 1 9 9 7 . 1 1 9 9 8 . 1 1 9 9 9 . 1 2 0 0 0 . 1 2 0 0 1 . 1 2 0 0 2 . 1 2 0 0 3 . 1 Time
Index
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
The second index that we selected for measuring institutional quality from ICRG is democratic accountability, which measures "how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possible violently in a non-democratic one."
The highest score of 5 indicates "free and fair elections for the legislature and executive as determined by constitution, viable opposition and independent judiciary." The lowest score of 0 indicates autarchy, as defined by "leadership of the state by a group or single person, without being subject to any franchise, either through military might or inherited right." 5 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Time Index run. This result seriously questions the validity of the widely accepted belief in a tradeoff between democratic reform and economic growth. 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1997 1999 
Econometric Method
We divide our quantitative analysis into two main parts, addressing long-run and short-run questions in turn. Starting with the long run, we adopt the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test methodology of Pesaran et al. (2001) to test for the existence of a long-run relationship among institutional quality and GDP growth using Hong Kong data from 1984 to 2003. This technique does not require the researcher to assume that the underlying institutional quality and economic growth series are I(0) or I(1). In particular, we find difficulty in ascertaining whether the indexes of institutional quality are stationary. On the one hand, these indexes can be labeled as stationary because they can only take on a limited range of discrete values. On the other hand, they clearly exhibit patterns of non-stationarity in formal unit root tests, as will be demonstrated later. Thus, using the ARDL bounds test approach is especially appealing in this context to avoid confronting the problem of identifying the order of integration of the indexes of institutional quality.
The ARDL regression yields a test statistic that can be compared to two asymptotic critical values. If the test statistic is above the upper critical value, then the null hypothesis of no long-run equilibrium relationship between institutional quality and economic growth can be rejected regardless of whether the series are integrated of order of zero or one. Alternatively, if the test statistic falls below the lower critical value, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, again regardless of whether the series are I(0) or
I(1).
If the test statistic falls between the bounds of the two critical values, then the result is inconclusive. We expect from the theory that the results will show a long-run equilibrium relationship between the underlying institutional quality and GDP growth.
The ARDL bounds test approach begins with an unrestricted VAR in levels: 
where Ω is positive definite and given by
ε , can be expressed in terms of t IQ ε , as 8 The discussion on ARDL bounds test approach here follows closely the exposition by Atkins and Coe (2002) .
We manipulate the VAR model of (1) to obtain a vector error correction model (VECM) such as:
where
, L is the lag operator, and (4) is the long-run multiplier matrix and is given by
where I is a 2 x 2 identity matrix. As each of the series can be I(0) or I(1), the diagonal elements of the λ matrix are left unrestricted. Moreover, we can only test at most one long-run relationship under this procedure. Hence, a zero restriction on one of the offdiagonals of the λ matrix is required. We impose 0
, which implies that there is no feedback from the level of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, we can assess the validity of the forcing variable assumption by testing for the exclusion of the lagged GDP growth in the institutional quality equation of the vector error correction model (VECM) described by (4). We expect that institutional quality is long-run forcing for GDP growth.
Given the assumption of 0
and (3), the equation for the growth rate of GDP from the VECM of (4) can be written as:
We can interpret (7) as an ARDL(p, q) model, where p is the number of lagged differences of the growth of GDP and q is the number of lagged differences of institutional quality as measured by either the rule of law or democratic accountability. In practice, p and q do not have to be the same and our search for optimal orders of p and q is based on two considerations. The optimal ARDL(p, q) model must be parsimonious and it must be free of serial-correlation. In (7), the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality is 0 :
. We first estimate (7) (7), there is a stable long-run relationship between the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality, which is described by (8)
and t ν is a mean-zero stationary process.
Once (7) is estimated and a long-run stable relationship is detected, we can then use (8) to calculate the long-run equilibrium relationship.
The second part of our analysis examines short-run Granger causation between institutional quality and GDP growth. Granger causation tests require that the underlying institutional quality and GDP growth series are stationary or, alternatively, that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship among them. Using the ARDL bounds test methodology in the first part to test for a long-run equilibrium relationship between the underlying series will allow us to assess the validity of Granger causation tests. From the theory, we expect that institutional quality Granger causes GDP growth in Hong Kong.
The widely-used Granger (1969) where t x and t y are the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality at time t. The bivariate VAR in (9) tests causality by implementing the propositions that 1) the future cannot cause the present or the past, 2) an event x can cause y only if it occurs before y , and 3) the prediction of y can be made more accurate given the occurrence of x . These basic intuitions underlie the widely-used Granger causality test. Formally, x Grangercauses y if the mean square error associated with the prediction of t y given the
, is smaller than the mean square error associated with the prediction of t y given the information set that does not include past x , ( )
In the framework set out above we use an information set consisting of only past x and past y . Thus, in the first line of (9) γ jointly equal zero in the second line of (9). In case of a rejection resulting from both F-tests in (9), we have a bi-directional causality or a feedback relationship between x and y .
Tests of Stationarity
Before discussing the results of our ARDL bounds tests and Granger causality tests, we show the results of stationary tests. These preliminary tests are useful to illustrate the difficulty in assessing the stationarity of the institutional quality series and, consequently, the appropriateness of adopting the ARDL bounds test approach. Table 1 hypothesis of a unit root. Thus, there is strong evidence that both the growth rates of GDP and investment are stationary, whereas the rule of law and democratic accountability appear to be non-stationary in the full sample period. Based on the ADF test results for the full sample in Table 1 , the rule of law and democratic accountability appear to be non-stationary. However, when we split the full sample and conduct ADF tests for the sub-sample of 1997:3 to 2003:3, the results suggest that both the rule of law and democratic accountability are stationary, leading us to believe that the two series may be I(0) if we allow a one-time change in the level and/or the slope of the trend function of the series. 9 We use the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test of stationarity with an endogenous break in level and/or trend to test this. The advantage of the Zivot and Andrews test is that it does not require the researcher to assume a break point in the series a priori, which is particularly appropriate in our case because various possible break dates suggest themselves and it is not clear a priori which is the most important. relationship can exist between the series of institutional quality and the growth rate of GDP. We therefore use the ARDL bounds test approach of Pesaran et al. (2001) to assess the existence of such a long-run relationship because, in contrast to more traditional cointegration tests, this method does not require all of the variables to be integrated of the same order.
The ARDL Bounds Test for the Existence of a Long-run Relationship
The results of the ARDL bounds tests are presented in Table 3 . We show the results from using the rule of law and democratic accountability as a measure of institutional quality in Panels A and B respectively. The results of estimating (7) Table 3 shows the long-run effect of the forcing variable, t x , on t y as indicated by the calculated coefficient, π , of (8). We calculated π to be -0.591 between the rule of law and the growth rate of GDP with a P-value of 0.383. As the F-statistic indicates that there is no evidence of a long-run relationship between the rule of law and the growth rate of GDP, we can ignore its calculated π .
The results of estimating (7) In (7), we assume that institutional quality is long-run forcing for the growth of GDP.
If, instead, we assume that the growth rate of GDP is forcing for institutional quality as in (10) below, then can we still detect a long-run relationship between the same two variables?
(10)
The estimation results for (10) in Table 3 indicate that there is no evidence of a longrun relationship between institutional quality and the growth rate of GDP when institutional quality is assumed to be forcing for the growth of GDP. For both measures of institutional quality, the optimal model is ARDL(1, 1), and both measures show Fstatistics that fall below the lower critical value bound, which leads to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality. Thus, the results of (10) show strong evidence that the growth rate of GDP has little impact on institutional quality as measured by the rule of law or democratic accountability in the long run. Our assumption of institutional quality as longrun forcing for the growth rate of GDP is thus validated.
Since we argue that one of the main channels through which institutional quality affects the growth rate of GDP is investment, we should then observe a long-run relationship between institutional quality and the growth rate of investment, as specified by (11) The estimation results of (11) in Table 3 show that there is a long-run relationship between the growth rate of investment and institutional quality. Both measures of institutional quality in Table 3 indicate an optimal model of ARDL(3, 1) with an Fstatistic that is greater than the critical value upper bound at the 5 percent significance level, which leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship. It should be noted, however, that the long-run relationship between the growth rate of investment and the rule of law is degenerate, which is shown by the statistically insignificant calculated π for (11) in Panel A of Table 3 (P-value = 0.284). A degenerate long-run relationship means that the growth of investment depends on its own lagged values and not on the lagged value of the rule of law. However, the long-run relationship between the growth rate of investment and democratic accountability is not degenerate, because the calculated π is 4.822 with a P-value of 0.004. That is, for every one point increase in the rating of democratic accountability, the growth rate of investment, on average, increases by roughly 4.8 percentage points in the long-run.
In sum, this section discusses the ARDL bounds test approach and its application to finding a long-run relationship between measures of institutional quality and the growth rate of GDP, and between measures of institutional quality and the growth rate of investment. We find the existence of a long-run relationship between the growth rate of GDP and democratic accountability, but not between the growth rate of GDP and the rule of law. The absence of a relationship between growth and the rule of law might be explained by the observation that the rule of law remained very stable over the sample period, so that if a relationship does exist it is not discernible in our data set. These results were dependent on the assumption that institutional quality is long-run forcing for the growth rate of GDP, an assumption which was supported by tests of its validity. We also find a long-run relationship between the growth rate of investment and each measure of institutional quality, although that for the rule of law is degenerate. Thus, on the whole, the evidence is supportive of the claim that the growth rate of GDP in Hong Kong over the full sample period depended directly and indirectly on institutional quality as measured by democratic accountability.
Granger Causality Tests
The results of the Granger causality tests are Table 4 shows the estimated coefficient of
γ , in (9). From these estimated coefficients, we can roughly see the magnitude and direction of the causal relationship between the explained and explanatory variables. In Row 2 of Table 4 , we report the results of tests of the short-run dynamic causal relationship between the growth rate of investment and the rule of law. The 2 χ statistic confirms the absence of serial correlation because the P-values are all larger than 0.05.
For Row 2, the F-statistics are insignificant, which reflects an absence of causation between the rule of law and investment growth in either direction.
In Rows 3 and 4 of Table 4 we show the results of dynamic short-run causal relationships between the growth rate of GDP and democratic accountability, and between the growth rate of investment and democratic accountability. The results in the first line of Row 3 show that the growth rate of GDP is significantly predicted by the lagged values of democratic accountability at the 5.6 percent level. In the last column, the estimated effect of last quarter's democratic accountability on the current growth rate of GDP, 1 λ , is 1.262 with a marginal significance level of 4.1 percent. Thus, on the average, for every one-point increase in the rating of democratic accountability, next quarter's GDP will increase by 1.26 percent. The second line in Row 4 shows the results of using the growth rate of GDP to explain democratic accountability. As expected, there is no evidence that, even in the short-run, the growth of GDP has any significant effect on democratic accountability.
In Row 4, the results of using democratic accountability to predict the growth of investment and vice versa are shown. The F-statistic of 6.793 indicates that democratic accountability is a highly significant predictor of the growth of investment. The effect of last quarter's democratic accountability on the current growth rate of investment is estimated to be 2.190, which suggests that for every one-point increase in the rating of democratic accountability, investment will grow by roughly 2.2 percentage points in the current quarter. The estimated effect is statistically significant at the 0.6 percent level. Does the growth of investment help increase democratic accountability? The answer is no, as indicated by the results in the second line of Row 5. The F-statistic of 0.750 reflects that the growth rate of investment has no predictive power for democratic accountability.
In sum, the Granger causality tests show that democratic accountability is a good predictor of the growth rates of GDP and investment in the short-run. However, none of these causal relationships involving democratic accountability are bi-directional, meaning that the causality only runs from democratic accountability to either the growth of GDP or investment, and not in the opposite direction. Moreover, tests in this section show no significant dynamic causal relationships involving the rule of law.
Robustness Tests
We have so far addressed the existence of long-and short-run causal relationships between the growth rate of GDP and institutional quality. However, in a more realistic setting, the growth rate of GDP is affected not only by institutional quality, but also by other important macroeconomic variables. The literature on institutions and growth suggests that an important additional macro variable is investment. Therefore, we check whether there is a long-run equilibrium relationship among institutional quality, the growth rate of investment, and the growth rate of GDP as specified by (12) below.
(12) Table 5 confirm that there is a long-run relationship among the growth rate of GDP, democratic accountability, and investment growth. Moreover, the relationship is not degenerate because the calculated π is highly significant with a P-value of 0.043. Thus, the growth rate of GDP depends not only on its own lagged values, but also on the lagged values of democratic accountability even after controlling for the effect of the growth of investment on the growth of GDP. This finding indicates that, in addition to its indirect effect through investment, democratic accountability has an independent effect on the growth rate of GDP in Hong Kong. Note: Institutional quality is measured by democratic accountability (DA). DAFC is a dummy with a value of 1 for the last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998, and 0 otherwise. p is the number of lagged differences of the explained variable and q and n are the numbers of lagged differences of the explanatory variables as listed in Column 2. The significance level. The P-value for π is calculated using the delta method.
We report the results of the Granger causality test for GDP growth using democratic accountability and investment growth as explanatory variables in Panel B, Table 5 . Here, we intend to check whether the short-run causal relationship between GDP growth and democratic accountability still holds if we control for the effect of investment growth.
The results in the first row of Panel B, Table 5, show that democratic accountability, in the presence of the growth rate of investment, is a highly significant predictor of the growth rate of GDP, as shown by the F-statistic of 10.477 or P-value of 0.002. It is also estimated that for every one-point increase in the rating of last quarter's democratic accountability, the growth rate of GDP increases by 1.14 percentage points in the presence of the growth rate of investment. The second row of Panel B presents results in the opposite direction: democratic accountability is explained by the growth rate of GDP in the presence of the growth of investment. The results, as expected, show no sign of a feedback relationship running from the growth rate of GDP to democratic accountability.
We now consider the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the Hong Kong economy, which some critics believe explains the economic downturn and recession after the institutional changeover in July 1997. On October 23, 1997, the Hong Kong dollar came under speculative attack, but Hong Kong maintained its currency link with the US dollar at 7.75 HKD/USD. This brought about a sudden and substantial loss of competitiveness in relation to its neighbors in competing goods and services, and put considerable downward pressure on the rate of GDP growth. 10 It is possible that it was this shock rather than changes in democratic accountability that explains the subsequent slowdown in economic activity. We address this issue by controlling for the onset of the Asian financial crisis in our analysis of the growth/institutional quality relationship. A dummy variable, DAFC, which takes the value of 1 for the last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998, and 0 otherwise, is added to the ARDL model of (7) as follows. The results of estimating the extended model of (13) are shown in the first row of Panel C, Table 5 . We see that DAFC has an expected negative sign in the growth equation, although it is only marginally significant ( D ρ = -1.764 with a P-value = 0.082).
Moreover, and most importantly, we see that when the Asian financial crisis dummy is added to the model, democratic accountability still has a stable long-run relationship with the growth rate of GDP (F-statistic = 15.805 with a P-value = 0.000). We also see that the estimated long-run marginal effect of democratic accountability on GDP growth, π , is not substantially reduced by the introduction of the Asian financial crisis control variable (from 1.525 to 1.250). Thus, although the Asian financial crisis negatively affected the growth rate of GDP, it cannot explain away the stable long-run relationship between the growth rate of GDP and democratic accountability and the negative effects of the institutional change in 1997 on Hong Kong's growth rate.
The results in the second row of Panel C of Table 5 show that the long-run relationship between democratic accountability and the growth rate of investment remains relatively unchanged despite adding the DAFC dummy (F-statistic = 13.150 with a P-value = 0.000). This reflects the fact that the onset of the Asian financial crisis had little effect on the growth of investment, as also shown by the insignificant estimate of The robustness tests strongly confirm that institutional quality as measured by democratic accountability has a stable long-run relationship with the growth rate of GDP and the growth rate of investment. The test results show that we can observe stable longand short-run causal relationships between the two series even after accounting for the effects of important macroeconomic variables such as investment growth and temporary events such as the Asian financial crisis.
Conclusion
This paper empirically investigates how changes in institutions in Hong Kong over the past two decades, and in particular since the changeover of sovereignty in 1997, have affected Hong Kong's economic growth. A number of government policies, including the proposed national security law, the referral of judgments of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the decision to supply 85,000 public housing units a year, and the rejection of universal suffrage in 2008 for the legislative council and the chief executive by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, have all reduced the responsiveness of the Hong Kong SAR government to its people, as reflected by its worsening rating of democratic accountability. In contrast to democratic accountability, the rule of law in Hong Kong has remained strong and stable over the course of institutional change.
Our empirical evidence shows a significant stable long-run relationship between democratic accountability and the growth rate of GDP for the sample period from 1984 to 2003. Using the ARDL bounds test approach, we establish that institutional quality, as measured by democratic accountability, is a statistically significant contributor to Hong Kong's real GDP growth and real investment growth. Thus, among other things, both real GDP growth and investment growth depend on the development of democratic accountability in the long run. Moreover, Granger causality tests reveal that democratic accountability Granger causes real GDP growth and investment growth in Hong Kong in the short run. This finding adds further weight to the argument that democratic accountability is important for economic growth in Hong Kong not only in the long run, but also in the short run.
We do not detect a stable long-run relationship between the rule of law and the real growth rates of GDP and investment in Hong Kong. We explain this result by noting that Hong Kong's rule of law has remained remarkably strong and stable over the sample period, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Thus, it is not possible to account for the variations in GDP and investment growth rates using a series that is close to invariant through time.
Another finding that deserves mention here is that the stable long-run relationship between democratic accountability and the growth rates of GDP and investment is unidirectional. That is, we detect a stable long-run relationship only when we assume that democratic accountability is the long-run forcing variable for the growth rates of GDP and investment. The same holds true for the Granger causation tests: the direction of causation runs only from democratic accountability to the growth rates of GDP and investment, and not the other way. Thus, there is no evidence to support the argument that higher growth rates of GDP and investment in Hong Kong in the sample period influenced the development of democratic accountability.
We subject our empirical results to robust testing using variables that control for the effects of investment growth and the onset of Asian financial crisis. We find that democratic accountability has an independent effect on GDP growth in addition to its indirect effect through the investment channel. We also find that controlling for the onset of the Asian financial crisis has little effect on our results. The crisis, which hit Hong Kong in October 1997, cannot completely explain Hong Kong's protracted economic downturn in recent years. The results suggest that what is driving the long-run relationship between democratic accountability and the growth rates of GDP or investment is relatively unaffected by temporary events such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
The policy implications of our findings are clear. Institutional change in 1997 has had a negative effect on democratic accountability in Hong Kong, which in turn directly or indirectly slows down the growth rate of GDP. It is not the Asian financial crisis, but the worsening democratic accountability and investment climate that should be blamed for most of the Hong Kong's experience of prolonged economic downturn. Moreover, the results of this paper imply that policy makers should not view improving democratic accountability as involving a cost in terms of lower economic growth, as has been argued in the Hong Kong press. On the contrary, improving democratic accountability is a source of faster growth of GDP and investment both in the long and short run, and any impediments to democratic reform are likely to be detrimental to Hong Kong's continuing prosperity.
